The period centers on how private information is transformed into public signals through markets, revealing conditions under which price processes reveal private information and endogenize fully informative equilibria. A second core thread investigates information asymmetry, moral hazard, and contract design as drivers of capital-market outcomes, examining disclosures, dividends, and external information in relation to welfare. Additional work develops Bayesian perspectives on information production and learning in markets, and analyzes information overload and its effects on consumer search and decision making. Influential Works: Foundational results show that imperfect information can be leveraged to improve contracts under moral hazard, defining when information value arises and how it should be used. Analyses of asymmetric information and quality standards reveal licensing can improve welfare by mitigating adverse selection and deterioration, informing regulatory design. Representation theorems and the concept of favorable versus unfavorable news, together with the emergence of strategic information transmission, establish simple, tractable models of information flows and persuasion.